Green shoots emerging - but Kenny needs to be more ruthless

It's three years since Ireland stumbled to a dismal 2-0 win at home to Gibraltar.

Mick McCarthy had succeeded in bringing his unique brand of chip-on-shoulder stubbornness and resilience back to a beleaguered group of players, after the miserable end to O'Neill's reign. They were hard to beat (one defeat in ten matches by the end of his tenure), but equally difficult to watch. It was a limited side, shorn of any real creativity or attacking threat in the wake of Keane, Hoolahan and Walters's retirements. Coleman, Duffy and McClean were the heart and soul of the team, reflecting those qualities of aggression and determination that kept Ireland competitive in the group; McGoldrick provided flashes of quality up front in his thankless role, but service was sorely lacking. Whelan, Hendrick and Hourihane filled space in midfield, without offering any real authority, dynamism or creativity. Stevens was a constant source of anxiety at left-back. Robinson was marooned on the flank, under instruction to run around and put in crosses. Doherty was underused as a deputy right-back. Fringe players like Judge, Maguire, O'Dowda, Hogan, Collins, Horgan and O'Brien offered nothing. Shane Long, Robbie Brady and James McCarthy were done.

It was clear that Kenny would have a massive rebuilding job on his hands, and so it has proved. Kelleher, Bazunu, Travers, Omobamidele, Collins, O'Shea, Molumby, Cullen, McGrath, Knight, Idah, Parrott, Connolly, Obafemi and Ogbene have all made their first competitive starts under Kenny. Some of those mentioned will need to recover from injuries, or regain form, but the majority look like being part of Ireland's future; a potentially exciting few years, if the last two games are anything to go by.

The question remains about Stephen Kenny's competence in the role. The Armenia game was a miserable failure, and no amount of sophistry about XG, fatigue and unfavourable weather can spin it positively. Coleman looked physically shot in a young man's position at wing-back; Stevens looked hopelessly out of his depth on the other side. The three up front were disjointed, often seeming to get in each other's way, with no focal point for the attack. At home to an experimental Ukraine team, Ireland suffered again from this flawed formation - Cullen looked isolated in midfield, with Hendrick doing one of his customary disappearing acts; Ogbene and Robinson looked out of form, and so much ball was dying with Cyrus Christie and Stevens on the flanks.

The switch to 3-5-2 has been fruitful, with Knight and Molumby providing aggression and dynamism - and no little skill - in an area which badly needed such an injection. It's brought the best out of Troy Parrott, who has impressed with his movement, work-rate and awareness. In Obafemi, Ireland may have finally unearthed a worthy successor to Robbie Keane; his goal and assist against Scotland were of genuine elite quality. The formation change may also bring out the best in Idah and Connolly in the future, who should, on ability alone, be able to contribute more than the limited Scott Hogan. Connolly remains a big 'maybe', though.

Should Kenny have cottoned on to this earlier? In 2000, Mick McCarthy stumbled on his best XI after Mark Kennedy and Phil Babb got into trouble with the Gardaí; McAteer and Dunne came in to replace them for the Dutch game - the rest is history. Similar to Mick's early years between 1996 and 1999, there has been a lot of trial and error in Kenny's selections; now that he has found a satisfactory formation that allows us to be compact defensively, fluid in attack, and get the best out of our gifted youngsters, it's up to him to stick with it, develop it, and continue to find alternatives to the dead wood he inherited.

At goalkeeper and centre-back, Ireland now have an embarrassment of riches. Kelleher did little wrong in his four starts, and should be pushing Bazunu for his place. In Lodz, Dara O'Shea and Nathan Collins were colossal, and Lenihan is also now a live option as an alternative to Duffy and Egan. Wing-backs are an issue, but Doherty will strengthen Ireland on his return; McClean will have to do for the moment on the other side, until one of Bagan, Adaramola or even Tyreik Wright comes of age in the left-sided position. The Derry man deserved the captaincy last night for his tireless service, and the example he sets in his passion for the international game - but his defence is a major weak link, along with his noted limitations on the ball.

In midfield, Jayson Molumby seems to have finally come of age in a more compact midfield three - his athleticism has never been in doubt, but he seems to have regained the composure and decision-making that marked him as a future star at U-21 level. Knight is excelling in a deeper role; his use of the ball and dribbling ability making him more influential in Ireland's transitions, rather than being marooned as a wide forward. With Connor Ronan, Will Smallbone and Conor Noss next on the conveyor belt as playmakers, and McGrath still an option, a three-man midfield makes perfect sense.

Up front, our best prospects are more central than wide - Kenny has always loved a three-man attack, but Ireland are sorely lacking in out-and-out wide forwards, in the roles Elbouzedi and Connolly played for his U21 side. Ogbene will be an effective player for Ireland as a crowd-pleasing agent of chaos, much in the McClean mould ten years ago; however, his technical and passing limitations will probably stop him from having a top-level career. After a very effective autumn last year, Robinson has reverted to type as a frustrating forward with little end-product - not quick or creative enough for a wide position, not clinical, clever or powerful enough as a number nine.

It seems that the older players, those who toiled so ineffectively against Gibraltar in 2019, are still holding Ireland back. Coleman, Duffy, McClean, Stevens, Christie, Hendrick, Hourihane, Robinson and Hogan are the remaining links with the hoofball eras of O'Neill and McCarthy - something we'd rather leave in the past. Some of these men will have a part to play in the next two years, simply because of the lack of current alternatives in the top English leagues - but if the last two games have shown anything, it's that a gameplan which mixes traditional Irish aggression and bravery with 21st century, progressive football can only be implemented by trusting the fearlessness of youth. The older generation seems to be contaminated by the fear and passivity instilled by the British-style 'proper football men' of previous regimes, and if younger, better alternatives are too slow to emerge, games like the Yerevan debacle will continue to happen. Kenny needs to realise this. It was depressing to see Hendrick and Hourihane coming on yet again last night, particularly when the likes of Jamie McGrath and Connor Ronan - both sitting at home or on holiday - could have gained valuable experience. The manager needs to identify alternatives to the old brigade, and be brave enough to select them.

Is Stephen Kenny the only manager in the world who could possibly get the best out of this young squad? No. Is he the only one within the FAI's price range? Probably not, with a bit of vision and imagination. But with Chris Hughton, Roy Keane, Robbie Keane and Neil Lennon still among the bookie's favourites to succeed Kenny, the FAI are probably better-served sticking with their man. If September represents another backwards step, hard questions will be asked about his decision-making, and why there seems to be so much trial-and-error; if his squad building has been methodical, or simply a series of happy accidents. But the last two games were of a level not seen from an Irish team since 2016, and will save his job.

The inconsistency is annoying - how can we have performed so poorly in the first two games, when the players showed such prowess in the second two? It could be an issue of Kenny's competence; being more reactive than proactive; lacking in real decisiveness; failing to see solutions until it's too late, and points have been dropped. It could be the inevitable travails of a small footballing nation with no established elite-level players, as it continues its most painful of transitions. It could be a bit of both. Moments like Obafemi's rocket and Collins's Beckenbauer impression could be mere flashes in the pan, or the start of something special. September won't be boring, at least.

Ireland in 2021 - Kenny perseveres through Irish football's Culture War

One of the unwanted side-effects of modern technology – social media in particular – is that every talking point seems to be part of a wider ‘Culture War.’ Your side is already decided – it’s what you feel in your gut. There’s enough information out there to wholly validate your fears, your revulsion, your righteous indignation, your hatred of the ‘other’ – regardless of how paranoid, extreme, illogical, deluded or nonsensical those feelings are. Normal, reasonable people can transform into zealous ideologues on even the most trivial of issues.

It’s hard to be a hopeless romantic, or even a cautious optimist, these days, in a world of online discussion where it’s often more creditable to be negative, suspicious, and cynical. Even if you’re 100% wrong, it’s still better than the risk of appearing naïve.

In 2020, a new culture war emerged, which turned every Irish international football match into an unpleasant referendum about the manager’s suitability for the job.

From Day One, Stephen Kenny was always going to have his critics. The manner of his appointment was an immediate bone of contention, with Mick McCarthy and his backroom staff effectively being forced to stand down, rather than get a shot at finishing the qualifying campaign for the 2020/1) Euros. With a creditable enough performance against Denmark in the final group game, McCarthy may have earned the right to finish what he started – but the playoff itself had been a strange, default, backdoor route, somehow earned from the 2018 Nations League under O’Neill – it had nothing to do with McCarthy’s achievements. Furthermore, everyone could see that an enormous rebuilding job was on hand, and needed to be undertaken sooner rather than later. Under Mick, Ireland had performed atrociously home and away against Gibraltar, and were utterly outclassed in Georgia against a team ranked 95^th in the world. There needed to be a way forward that went beyond stale, often ineffective hoofball, and Stephen Kenny’s early pronouncements of progressivism gave some hope that Irish international football could finally be dragged – albeit kicking and screaming – into the 21^st century.

The Irish footballing public was clearly weary of hoofball. The entire culture of the team needed changing, and had done for some time; fans were sick of players hiding from the ball, sitting back against minnows, and launching the ball for isolated centre-forwards to chase their own flick-ons. We could look to Wales and Northern Ireland, who seemed entirely capable of playing constructive, modern, entertaining football, even with lower-tier players. There were clear examples to aspire to.

One question remained – was Stephen Kenny too ‘small time’ for such a massive undertaking? In front of a camera, he seemed awkward, muddled and generally uncomfortable – especially when compared to McCarthy’s charm and folksy Barnsley banter, or the precise, confident articulations of Ireland’s national and provincial rugby coaches. Could he communicate his ideas effectively to millionaires with significant top-level experience? Could he command the respect of the dressing room?

Unfortunately, the Nations League campaign in 2020 was an almost-unquantifiable exercise, with games played in front of empty stands, devoid of atmosphere; and players dropping like flies because of quarantine, positive Covid tests, and in some cases, disobeyed social distancing arrangements on the bus. The games were played at a lethargic pace, and two concerns were obvious about Kenny’s new-look Irish team; a complete lack of cutting edge up front (one goal in six games), and the players’ obvious discomfort playing from the back; very often, it seemed like passing for the sake of passing, with lots of go-nowhere possession, with the midfield looking undermanned and vulnerable when the ball was given away. The playoff against Slovakia, on the other hand, showed promise. Ireland enjoyed spells of good, purposeful possession, creating a number of clear-cut chances, and were desperately unlucky not to win, as Conor Hourihane inexplicably missed from six yards. The penalty shoot-out loss ended Ireland’s Euro 2020 hopes, and proved to be David McGoldrick’s swansong; he would prove difficult to replace.

Ireland generally employed a 4-3-3 formation in these games, as Kenny had done with the U21s – but with no-one capable of playing the #10 role to link things, Josh Cullen often isolated in the defensive midfield position, Callum Robinson and Aaron Connolly uncomfortable as orthodox wingers, and the defensive shortcomings of Doherty and Stevens often exposed as conventional full-backs, an earlier switch to 3-5-2 would have made more sense. Kenny would not bed in this formation until the first World Cup qualifier, once Chelsea’s Anthony Barry had come on board as assistant coach. The recruitment of Barry was a huge coup, offsetting the loss of Duff, who had walked out following the bizarre ‘Videogate’ episode, when a pre-match motivational video with supposedly over-nationalistic sentiments caused some unspecified disagreement among staff after a friendly against England. Given that Chelsea play with three at the back, Barry must be credited with influencing Kenny’s thinking, and Kenny credited for listening to good advice instead of allowing ego and stubbornness to overrule his judgement.

The switch to 3-5-2 would prove to be productive in time, but it was not an overnight success. In Belgrade, Ireland scored a well-worked opener through Browne, but old habits would die hard – Ireland sat back, lost their way and allowed Serbia a route back into the game, eventually losing 3-2. Ireland were denied a stonewall penalty with the score at 1-1 - like the Slovakia game, it was a creditable performance, but no result to go with it. A hard luck story.

Then, of course, Luxembourg happened.

What should have been a routine home win ended up being an utter embarrassment, just as cataclysmic as the draw with Liechtenstein in 1995, or the 5-2 defeat in Cyprus in 2006. In retrospect, we shouldn’t have been surprised; think back to Kazakhstan away in 2012, when Ireland were 1-0 down in the ninetieth minute; or Gibraltar away, when a wonder-save from Randolph denied the colonial outpost a famous draw. This appalling result had been in the post for years – a final, damning denouement of the FAI’s failure to develop Irish talent during the ruinous Delaney years. Kenny picked a solid team, finally dropping the likes of Hendrick, Brady and McClean after a succession of insipid performances. It just never clicked. James Collins was toiling to no effect up front, as Ireland struggled to play through the Luxembourg press. The sucker-punch came from Gelson Rodrigues – tellingly, the only Champions League player on the pitch – with five minutes to go. Ireland’s World Cup hopes were effectively in tatters with only two games played.

After a humdrum 1-1 draw with Qatar, Ireland went to Spain for a training camp, and took on Andorra. After fifty-two minutes of huffing and puffing in the Pyrenean sunshine, the unthinkable happened – Andorra took the lead.

At this disastrous point, it looked like Kenny was just not meant for the job. As supporters, we can bemoan the fact that we no longer have elite-level players at top-six EPL clubs – but surely a team of Championship and lower-EPL players should be expected to comfortably beat a team of amateurs? It looked irredeemable; the team was devoid of confidence or proactiveness, with so many players seeming unwilling to take the initiative expected of a modern footballer in a passing side. Thankfully, sanity was restored by Troy Parrott’s impressive brace, and Ireland took advantage of Andorran fatigue to win 4-1, but the first fifty minutes were very concerning. Ireland would go away to Portugal in September, and despite a reasonably respectable 0-0 draw in Hungary, all signs pointed towards a record defeat in Ireland’s near future.

At this point, there was a sense of growing unrest and bleakness among Irish fans. One win in thirteen games; just nine goals scored – with four of them coming against Andorra. More or less out of the running for World Cup qualification. Any goodwill from the competent performances away to Serbia and Slovakia had been eroded by the Luxembourg game. There were no green shoots to speak of; apart from Gavin Bazunu and Dara O’Shea, none of the new faces had laid down a marker. Josh Cullen seemed isolated and vulnerable at times in midfield; Jayson Molumby was trying too hard, charging around the pitch as if his life depended on it; Aaron Connolly, Adam Idah and Troy Parrott were not living up to the promise of their goalscoring underage exploits. Callum Robinson was the biggest disappointment; constantly wasteful in front of goal despite some good performances for West Brom in high-profile games.

Looking at the star-studded Portuguese line-up before kick-off in Faro, facing an Irish team with one win in thirteen games under Kenny, it seemed like a write-off. However, Irish teams are always good for a solid, backs-to-the-wall performance when the chips are down, and a youthful Irish side produced a display full of traditional grit and character, as well as some fine, dynamic football - a long way removed from the timid, passing-by-numbers fare of 2020. Ireland tore Portugal’s defence asunder on several occasions with swift counter-attacks, many launched by the clever passing of Cullen and industriousness of Doherty on the left. Bazunu produced a magnificent save from a questionably-awarded Ronaldo penalty, and Ireland took a deserved lead just before half-time, Egan heading in a corner from newcomer Jamie McGrath. Ireland would predictably sit back and rely more on counter-attacks after the break, but the defence was resolute, debutant Andrew Omobamidele carrying on the good, aggressive, composed work from the injured Dara O’Shea. The lively Aaron Connolly had a strong penalty claim after being bundled over by Ruben Dias, but it wasn’t given.

Of course, then Ronaldo started doing Ronaldo things, and Kenny was denied a famous victory, but it had been a very encouraging performance; Ireland were not just committed and resolute, but tidy in possession, superb in their shape and defensive organisation, and refreshingly ambitious and willing to play it forward. It showed competent management, and some signs that the project was finally beginning to click.

One step forward, two steps back. For the first ten minutes against Azerbaijan at home, Ireland looked like running riot. However, pressure couldn’t be converted into goals, as the forward line of Connolly, Parrott and Idah toiled to little effect, their callowness showing against the grizzled Azeri defence. After the promise of the Portugal game, it was curious why the excellent Jamie McGrath was dropped, with Parrott certainly not a like-for-like swap. Ireland were unbalanced in the final third, and when they threatened, Idah proved to be an unreliable finisher. The young Norwich striker had performed the target-man role with aplomb in Faro, but seemed to lack composure when presented with clear-cut chances. The Azeris took a shock lead, yet another speculative shot from distance finding the Irish net. In the second half, Ireland employed some more traditional Route One tactics, and after a long period of relentless crossing, a ball from Cullen ended up on the head of Shane Duffy, as Ireland battled back to rescue a point. It was a very disappointing result, and Kenny found himself under pressure once again. A similarly passive performance against Serbia would surely render his position untenable.

Instead, there was another spirited display; Ireland went behind in the first half to a clearly superior side, but battled back in the second half, with an encouraging mix of sharp passing and traditional aggression. Bazunu was again magnificent in thwarting the Serbs’ breakaway efforts, and the equaliser came from a comical own-goal, but Ireland were worth a point. Omobamidele was excellent again, and almost raised the roof when his last-minute long-range shot was tipped over by the Serbian goalkeeper. Despite the positive display, and the genuine enthusiasm from the home crowd, Ireland were mathematically out of the running, and the jury was still out on Kenny. Anything less than two convincing wins away to Azerbaijan and Luxembourg would most likely spell the end.

Kenny's men negotiated the first obstacle in October, blitzing the Azeris with a two-goal start in Baku, Robinson silencing his critics with two well-taken efforts, and the lively Ogbene getting his first international goal.

Ireland showcased their newly-found attacking potential for an appreciative home audience in a 4-0 win over Qatar, with Robinson helping himself to a hat-trick – the fourth goal constructed by a wonderfully patient passage of play, involving over thirty consecutive passes. The Portugal game showed a steely side to this brave new Ireland, competing manfully against an elite side with world-class players, who came to Dublin needing a result. It showed that old-school Irish grit, courage and aggression did not necessarily have to be sacrificed for the sake of ‘nice’ football.

With Kenny’s backside still somewhat perched on the bacon-slicer, Ireland travelled to Luxembourg for a revenge mission. Against the backdrop of disparaging remarks about Ireland’s ‘British style’ by their manager, Ireland set about their task with a resolve and intensity that was missing from the March game; and a hardy, confident and tidy Luxembourg side was eventually ground down by a determined display. While it took a typically scrappy Duffy effort to put Ireland in the lead, the following two goals, from Ogbene and Robinson, were the result of clever movement, and intricate and incisive passing. It was a confirmation of how far Ireland had come in just six months; vindication for the style and personnel that had endured such nightmarish growing pains in the international game. Kenny would live to fight another day.

To the denouement: should Kenny stay in the job for the Euros?

The naysayers will point to the Luxembourg and Azerbaijan results at home - and not without justification, as they represented a nadir for Irish football, comparable to Cyprus/San Marino under Staunton. Could Kenny have done better? Of course. In 2020, he wasted a lot of development time bedding in a 4-3-3 formation, which would eventually be scrapped. Ireland were still getting used to the new Barry-influenced 3-4-2-1 system, ironing out the kinks, for the first two qualifiers – and six vital points were lost as a result, giving Ireland an insurmountable deficit to claw back. For the draw with Azerbaijan, Kenny put too much faith in youngsters Parrott, Idah, Connolly and Molumby – their lack of experience and composure was telling, as pressure failed to translate into goals. Kenny’s record stands at two wins in fifteen competitive games, which is something that clearly needs to improve in the upcoming Nations League – transition and ‘development’ can only justify poor results for a limited timeframe. That time is now up. Playing progressive football and giving youth its head will only earn a certain amount of goodwill before fans and media start to turn nasty, and Kenny must be fully accountable now. He’s lost a coach who seemed to be an influential figure behind the scenes, and integral to Ireland’s tactical improvement since 2020, and the choice of replacement must not be taken lightly. June 2022 is a huge month for Kenny, and the improvement of late has to be sustained and significantly built on if Ireland are to take Ukrainian and Scottish scalps.

On the other hand, you have to be wilfully ignorant or utterly deluded to ignore the clear positives from the last six months. For the first time since possibly the autumn of 2004, Ireland were easy on the eye, and looked like an actual 21^st century football team. The goals finally started to come. Kenny unearthed gems like Jamie McGrath and Chiedozie Ogbene to deliver more subtlety and raw pace in the final third, and figured out how to get the best out of Callum Robinson’s talents. Even Jeff Hendrick and James McClean started to look like effective, accomplished international footballers. Shane Duffy had a renaissance. Josh Cullen went from strength-to-strength, and continues to improve as a midfield fulcrum with every game – his accurate passing and hunger for the ball, and ability to break up play, is a genuine pleasure to watch, particularly after eleven years of Glenn Whelan. Matt Doherty has come of age as an international, offering good link-up play and dynamism on the flanks. Gavin Bazunu, Caoimhin Kelleher, Jason Knight, Andrew Omobamidele, Nathan Collins and Dara O’Shea look like they’re on the road to long, fruitful international careers. This time last year (as I said here), it all looked unbearably bleak. Now, there are tangible reasons to be optimistic.

Furthermore, if competitive results are the be-all and end-all, it’s worth remembering what came before.

O’Neill in 2017: Played 8; Won 2 (against Moldova and Wales), Drew 4, Lost 2; Scored 6, conceded 8.

McCarthy in 2019: Played 8; Won 3 (against Gibraltar x2 and Georgia), Drew 4, lost 1; Scored 6, conceded 5.

Kenny in 2021: Played 8, Won 2 (against Azerbaijan and Luxembourg), Drew 3, lost 3. Scored 11, conceded 8.

It’s largely accepted that both MON and Mick had better, much more experienced squads to work with, and were playing a more pragmatic, ‘win ugly’ style which could only be justified if we were significantly overachieving. MON kept his job for another year, and there was a fair amount of discontent, particularly from ex-players, when McCarthy was let go early.

Yet, for the want of a single goal in any of the drawn or lost games in 2021 (which may have come if McGoldrick was still around, or if Robinson had got his vaccine, or if we hadn’t been denied stonewall penalties in Faro and Belgrade), Kenny’s record would be almost identical to his two predecessors in their last full years in the job. There's not much to separate them in terms of pure results.

But unlike many of his predecessors, Kenny hasn’t alienated, ignored, or stubbornly refused to pick international class players, to the team’s detriment. Team selections have not been as absurd or senseless as the worst days under O’Neill, Trap and Staunton. Pretty much all of the starting XI and subs are justifying their place. The players look like they know what they’re doing, and seem clear about their roles on the pitch. We are able to create chances and defend as a team. The atmosphere in the squad seems positive. The manager is not stubbornly wedded to rigid tactics, and he’s shown evidence of flexibility and adaptability, while maintaining a reasonably settled side. These are all positives, especially when you consider what went on under previous managerial teams, who were much better-paid, came with bigger reputations, and had actual Champions League/top-half EPL players to work with.

There is a clear way forward for this Irish team, with some exciting players coming through the youth system. Kenny and his coaches have shown that even modest Irish teams are actually capable of competing with the top seeds without resorting to hoofball, and capable of dominating those tricky, banana-skin games against lower seeds, and winning well. With a glut of options at centre-back, and no great wide attacking options, the 3-4-2-1 formation makes perfect sense. If the results in June are as poor as those in 2020, Kenny will probably have to fall on his sword – but whoever takes over should not, under any circumstances, regress to the outdated caveman football of his predecessors. The revolution must continue. If Kenny leaves this footballing culture change as a legacy, he will have done his country a service.

Ronaldo - a profound life lesson, in six vomit-inducing minutes

So, this happened.

Most likely from spending my formative years schooled on a curriculum of old-fashioned Catholic shame, I’ve always thought quite negatively of Ronaldo; I’ve never been able to stand how his incredible drive is seemingly motivated by ego, narcissism and vanity; that his only motivation for playing the game is to whip his top off, pose, flex and gurn for the cameras; to be the star of his own movie; to collect baubles for his own personal museum. It just seems awfully shallow and undignified to me. An inability to be gracious, modest or humble in victory.

But it’s a teachable moment. It was typical Ronaldo, and typical Ireland. As often happens, we got up for the big occasion and raised our game; we were brave, aggressive, well-organised, and – for a change – smart in possession. We produced our best, as usual, at a moment when our backs were to the wall; when fans feared the worst, and a heavy defeat was expected. The lads went out with a chip on their shoulder and a reserve of bitterness to sharpen their resolve.

But that’s us to a tee - not just in football, but rugby too. We're emotional, mercurial, flighty, and inconsistent. Sometimes we do, sometimes we don’t.

That’s why, historically, we struggle to impose ourselves and score goals, even against modest opposition. That’s why we concede late goals and throw away hard-earned leads. We’re not used to being in good habits and chasing consistent excellence. It’ll be this one-off strong performance, and back to being passive; lacking in self-belief; always playing to the level of the opposition. Leaving ourselves at mercy to the cruel fate of, say, a Macedonian set-piece goal; a freak Israeli shot from thirty yards; a referee missing a clear handball in Paris.

As an Ireland fan, sometimes you think we’re simply cursed. Doomed to failure by some kind of cosmic, pre-destined martyrdom. But this shit doesn’t happen by accident. It’s the final, inevitable result of institutional and cultural dysfunction in Irish football. It’s the result of cutting corners in our player development; of funds going on vanity projects and fat corporate salaries rather than competent coaches and academy facilities. It’s the result of players going to England at 15 and thinking they’ve ‘made it’ after buying their first flashy car and getting VIP entry to provincial nightclubs; trying to fit in with the vacuous dopes on the D-List celebrity circuit; turning up late to training after being out on the piss.

We can occasionally tap into our wells of talent and good, old-fashioned Irish stubbornness for one-off, spirited performances. But can we do it on a cold night against Azerbaijan? Ronaldo does it. And he does it because he steadfastly refuses to cut corners, rest on his laurels, or give in to cheap thrills. What is the bigger vice? Aiming low and failing to devote yourself fully to your talents? Or making the absolute best of yourself, and being a bit of an arrogant cunt about it?

Ronaldo, driven as he is by the shallowness of ‘stardom’, pursues excellence with crystal-clear focus and obsessive work-ethic. It brings to mind the central tenet of nihilism, which is what I was feeling profoundly at 9:53pm on Wednesday. There is no God; there is no meaning, or intrinsic ‘good’ or ‘fairness,’ in life. Ronaldo has decided to create his own meaning and be the tyrannical God of his domain. His freakish level of self-belief has been hard-earned through a monstrous level of conditioning and application. Yes, Ronaldo loves himself. But love is about respect, trust, gratitude and honour - and Ronaldo clearly applies those values to his body, his abilities and his sport.

Last Wednesday, his Portuguese team-mates represented the other extreme of Ireland’s historical failings – a team of expensive talents who produce top-level performances every week, just having one of those rare lazy, over-confident and complacent days. Ronaldo, quite literally, rose above it all, and there’s a hard lesson in that.

I don't want to be too harsh, or down on Ireland; while performances and results have been poor, Stephen Kenny's team are showing incremental improvements within a very difficult context, as the ex-Dundalk coach continues to pick up the pieces from decades of short-termism and FAI mismanagement. The ongoing effort to become a proper, 21st century international football team, basing a new team on the substrate of an excellent U21 side, was always going to be a difficult and necessary one. Gavin Bazunu and Adam Idah seem like young men who are committed to their craft, taking responsibility and maturing as internationals - and we need more like them, if we're going to reinvent ourselves as more than just gallant losers.

Tonight is the acid test for those ambitions, and Kenny's management. With the U21 conveyor belt of talent continuing to produce, it's clear that Irish football is going in the right direction, and will get there eventually. The former Dundalk manager has started a refreshingly ambitious project, with the best intentions at heart to rid ourselves of the traditional Irish clichés of hoofball and glorious failure.

But if we slip up against Azerbaijan, Kenny probably won't be around to see the fruits of his labour.

I actually couldn't be arsed anymore

With Irish underage teams doing so well in recent years, I had an idea that it was going to be the beginning of a golden generation – something akin to what came through under Kerr in the late ‘90s, with some elite-level players and a steady stream of good Premier League and upper-Championship level of talent to fill out a consistently competitive squad. This time, we would have a progressive young manager in place to jettison the dead-wood from a squad which has delivered nothing but failure, harness the immense talent of our underage conveyor belt, qualify for the World Cup in Qatar, and bring a smile back to the Irish national psyche as we continue to deal with these uncertain times.

But it's looking likely that we'll see the same old collection of passive, past-it cloggers who have rarely, if ever, delivered in an international shirt. Stephen Kenny will encourage them to pass the ball, but they'll end up giving it away cheaply, our defence will be exposed, and we'll probably lose about 4-0 to Serbia, and play out a dismal 1-1 with Luxembourg. Scoring an actual goal seems to be a lofty ambition, at this stage.

So what’s happened to our great young players this season?

The positives:

Caoimhin Kelleher looks like a talented goalkeeper, and has skipped ahead of Adrián at Liverpool. Gavin Bazunu is highly-rated at Man City and getting decent experience out on loan. Dara O’Shea has been good at times for West Brom. John Joe Finn, a Real Madrid youth product now at Getafe, might play for us. A fifteen-year-old winger, Kevin Zefi, has gone to Inter Milan, but there's a chance that he could end up playing for Albania (after Grealish and Rice, I'm not holding my breath about any dual-qualified player). Nathan Collins and Jason Knight look the most likely to succeed, but before we start talking about them as the new Paul McGrath and Roy Keane, it’s worth mentioning that Clive Clarke and Jeff Hendrick were spoken about in similar terms, playing in exactly the same positions for exactly the same clubs, in previous decades.

 The negatives:

Aaron Connolly hasn’t pushed on; in and out of the Brighton team, with two goals. Troy Parrott hasn’t scored in over twenty senior appearances on loan in the lower leagues; he couldn’t hack it in the Championship, now he can’t hack it in League One. Adam Idah was expected to explode in the Championship with Norwich; he’s made one start, fifteen substitute appearances, and scored two goals. An aspiring international striker should be doing better. Jayson Molumby has been seconded to the Irish graveyard of Preston. Conor Coventry is an afterthought at West Ham. Michael Obafemi has disappeared. Conor Masterson has gone backwards at QPR, and is now crocked. Unable to break into one of the most appalling Celtic teams of all time, Jonathan Afolabi and Lee O’Connor have been exiled to Dundee and Tranmere. God knows what happened to Luca Connell. Zak Elbouzedi – a serious talent for our U-21s – went to League Two and has since disappeared. Connor Ronan’s development has stalled in the second tier in Switzerland; he is running out of time to become the Hoolahan-level playmaker we so desperately need. Ryan Nolan is nursing a cruciate ligament injury, having swapped Inter Milan for Serie C, and subsequently Getafe’s B team, in the last year. Ryan Johansson decided he wasn’t arsed playing for us after all. Liam Delap and Louie Barry remain in the English youth system – we can only hope that they stall at their clubs, drop down the divisions a la Callum Robinson, declare for us, and come good later on in their careers - because if they continue to make waves at City and Villa, there’s absolutely no fucking chance of them playing for us.

So with our younger generation turning out to be more Terry Dixon than Robbie Keane, it’ll most likely be the same old faces in Belgrade. With Hendrick, Hourihane and Brady, we could end up having the most invisible midfield in world football. Shane Duffy will most likely start, possibly even as captain, despite the fact that he is, on current form, probably the worst professional footballer in the UK. Callum O’Dowda will probably appear somewhere in the front three, along with James McClean, who would be world-class if he put as much effort into his first touch as he puts into social media victimhood. Maybe Shane Long will lead the line, just to evoke memories of a time when we weren’t quite so shit.

As you can probably tell, I’m getting sick of all this.

For most of my life since I was nine years old, I’ve worked myself into frenzies of excitement and hopefulness before every Ireland game. Always the hope of a famous humbling of a bigger nation; a convincing defeat of a weaker side; a creditable draw away to a tough qualifying rival; a young player that I’ve followed since his youth team days coming good on the big stage; the chance to see world-class players like McGrath, Roy Keane and Duff in their prime; the drama, colour, spectacle and passion of international football.

Then, the national anthems are played, we kick off, and I bear witness to the first five minutes of calamitous, cowardly, unjustifiable ineptitude: ‘My God, we’re shit, and this is fucking terrible.’

I can’t recall how many times I’ve read about a promising young player, or watched him grow through the ranks; starring for the youth sides, making a maiden appearance in the Premier League, or scoring a few goals in the Championship. So many times, I've thought: ‘This is the one. This is the player Irish football needs,’ and started following their progress closely; dipping into the diehard fan forums of Blackburn, Fulham or Hull to canvas their collective expertise on our new Great White Hope.

Then, this wonderful young player ends up a hopeless, fat, alcoholic mess at Finn Harps. Or a bit-part player for Shamrock Rovers, getting roasted by some Bosnian kid in a Europa League qualifier. Or lining out in the seventh tier of English football. Or crippled by injury, having been kicked to pieces during a League Two loan spell.

So often, they just weren't good enough to begin with, and massively overhyped by clickbait journalists with article quotas to fill, and nothing better to write about – or fans just like me, clutching at whatever straws we can for some glimmer of hope.

As any regular reader of this blog will know, I tend to get consumed by my interests, often to the point of obsession. But I’m beginning to step away from Irish football, and I’m starting to concentrate on, quite frankly, more important things; stuff that will actually benefit me more than watching these useless green-shirted cunts repeatedly embarrassing themselves. Nutrition, running, weight-training, growing my own food, getting better at the guitar, reading good books; all better areas in which to devote my time and energy.

So this might mean no more blog, and I probably won't be quite so forthcoming with my opinion when you message me after matches. 😅 It's going to be nothing more insightful or considered than: 'we were shit' or 'that was surprisingly okay.' When you analyse something, there should be some kind of idea in your head that the problems are theoretically fixable. With Irish football, thanks to the FAI and John Delaney in particular, they are not - at least, not in the short-to-medium term.

Sure, we could have better-resourced LOI clubs to handle our young players, which could happen if they got better crowds and more public interest/sponsorship. But the thing is, I can well understand the reluctance of a grown adult human to spend their free time and hard-earned money watching League of Ireland football in the pissings of rain on a Friday night. It takes a special type of diehard to put themselves through that level of commitment, and unlike in, say, Croatia or Sweden, we don't have that kind of football culture. Rugby and GAA are simply able to provide a more enjoyable match-going experience for the casual fan, with the knowledge that they are watching elite-level players in their sports. This would still be the case even if LOI teams were run competently. Look at the USA - they've poured their immense resources, wealth, and can-do entrepreneur spirit into MLS, and tried to create a viable footballing culture. Yet average attendances aren't much higher than the Championship, and soccer is still seen as a game for girls, Latinos and dilettante nerd Europhiles, far-removed from the glamour and high-scoring spectacles of their native sports. Same in Australia, with competition from AFL, NRL and Rugby Union.

I’ll still try to enjoy the ninety minutes against Serbia, but I’m barely going to consume any of the build-up or post-mortems. If we’re unable to put two passes together, and struggling to get out of our half in the first ten minutes, I am going to – for the sake of my mental health – mute the TV, have a cup of lemon and ginger tea, put on some Pink Floyd, read a good book, and have the match on in the background.

But what if we play well and win?

The Staunton Years

Looking at the age profile of the current Irish squad, one sobering statistic illustrates the difficulties faced by Stephen Kenny in 2021. The only players aged between 23 and 27 (as of the start of this year) to have started competitive games for Ireland are as follows: Callum Robinson, Callum O’Dowda, Ryan Manning, Sean Maguire, and Alan Browne. Only one of these players is currently at a top-flight club, and it seems likely that he will be returning to the second tier of English football within six months. It’s an abjectly failed generation of talent, possibly indicative of the FAI’s ineptitude during the 2000s and early 2010s, when John Delaney was at his most powerful. It is also worth sadly noting that Jack Grealish, Declan Rice and Michael Keane are in that age group.

 In 2006, that 23-27 list was: Robbie Keane, Damien Duff, Richard Dunne, John O’Shea, Andy O’Brien, Steven Reid, Andy Reid, Colin Healy, Stephen Elliott and Clinton Morrison. In addition, Stephen McPhail, Liam Miller, Graham Barrett, Alan Quinn and Joe Murphy had all been capped, and had all been part of Brian Kerr’s squads in 2005. Other yet-to-be capped future internationals – Kevin Doyle, Joey O’Brien, Daryl Murphy, Damien Delaney, Wes Hoolahan, Jon Walters, Glenn Whelan, Keith Andrews, Keith Fahey, Stephen Kelly, Stephen Hunt, Liam Lawrence – had come through the youth system and were progressing in their (in some cases, late-blooming) careers. Compared to these days, there was a wealth of established talent – the closest to a ‘golden generation’ we’ve ever had – in their mid-twenties. They would, we hoped, provide the backbone of a strong, competitive Irish side in the three qualifying campaigns to come – filled out by established pros in their prime, like Given, Carr, Finnan, Harte and Kilbane, and promising youngsters like Aiden McGeady, Darron Gibson, Stephen Ireland and Anthony Stokes, who were all showing huge potential in the UK, surely destined for international stardom.

The problem was finding a coach who could potentially organise this pool of talent into something cohesive. After Brian Kerr’s reported struggles in the dressing room, it was clear that the job required a man who, above all, could command respect. Ireland needed a coach with either proven pedigree in the game, or a young, accomplished coach on an upward curve, with a reputation as a sharp, articulate, tactically intelligent student of the game. Someone sophisticated enough to know about the technical demands of international football and how they differed from the English game; someone who had an eye for genuine talent and the bravery not to bow to Premier League reputations; someone who could clearly and impressively communicate his ideas to a young group of talented players, and assure the watching media and fans that the Irish team was in sensible, responsible hands.

We got Steve Staunton.

Staunton was a full-blooded, dedicated player for Ireland. There is a nice anecdote of his introduction to the Irish squad, as an eighteen-year-old thrown in with the big egos of Brady, Stapleton, Lawrenson, et al. Upon Brady’s request to fetch them some tea and biscuits ‘like a good lad’, the young Liverpool full-back retorted: ‘fuck off and get your own fucking tea and biscuits.’ This admirable stubbornness served him well throughout a long career in the top flight in England, and 102 caps for his country. He has the remarkable distinction of playing in three World Cups, in three different positions. As a young left-back, he was part of a mean defence that conceded only three goals in five games in Italia ’90, and his engine, crossing ability and deadly set-pieces from the left wing were integral to Ireland’s qualification for USA ’94. While he lost a yard of pace in later years, he was ever-present in the squad, and capable of telling contributions – in 1999, his wonderful left foot gave Ireland a 3-2 win in Malta, when all around him were losing their heads. He was called on to fill in at centre-back against Portugal in 2001, then kept his place to successfully thwart Kluivert and van Nistelrooy in that era-defining game, and captained Ireland in Japan and Korea.

From the outside, Staunton seemed like a stoic; a man of few words who went about his business with quiet, understated toughness. In his unwanted media duties as captain in 2002, he glowered contemptuously at the media hordes, delivering turgid banalities in a nasal Louth monotone. That’s okay, we thought. He does his talking on the field. Compared to previous captains in front of the cameras, he seemed guarded and uncomfortable speaking publicly. Mick McCarthy had always come across as dryly humorous. Andy Townsend had been enthusiastic and charming. Roy Keane was Roy Keane. Staunton just didn’t seem like a player who would ever try his hand at punditry or management; you could see him enjoying his well-earned retirement in low-key domestic bliss; a simple life, away from the complexities of the modern game; raising a family and perhaps a little vegetable garden. Maybe a few rounds of golf with Kevin Moran every now and then, and the odd appearance opening a Sports Direct.

But God help us all, he went into coaching.

He finished his playing career with Walsall in 2005, combining his playing role with that of assistant to manager Paul Merson. In the meantime, John Delaney was promising us all the appointment of a ‘world-class managerial team.’ Along with the fanciful mentions of Alex Ferguson, Sir Bobby Robson’s name had come up, and while he showed an interest, it would have been a risky commitment for both parties, with the great man at an advanced age and looking increasingly frail. Thus, Delaney hit on a compromise; the ‘German model’. Jurgen Klinsmann had been appointed as Germany’s head coach with no prior experience, why couldn’t Ireland do the same? An ex-player who personified the national footballing character; tough, resilient, hard-working, honest, direct, and not without skill. With the guiding hand of Sir Bobby in an ‘International Football Consultant’ role to show him the ropes and impart his wisdom, what could possibly go wrong?

The idea could have worked out, in principle. Mick McCarthy had success with Ireland when he stopped trying to over-complicate things tactically, and just went four-four-effing-two, full-backs and wingers on their strongest side, big man and little man up front. He had encouraged his players to go out and play football if it was on, go direct if needed; work hard and keep their shape off the ball. Keeping things as simple as possible. With so little time to work with players, and the inevitabilities of injuries and suspensions, and clubs pulling players out of friendly games, the coach’s job at international level primarily consists of picking a balanced starting XI, making sure nobody is confused as to their role (or shoehorned into a position they don’t play at club level), and motivating them in the dressing room. The appointment of Robbie Keane as captain gave an indication that Staunton would – much like Declan Kidney as Ireland’s rugby head coach – empower his attacking players to play as they saw it, rather than appointing a centre-back or midfielder to be the dictatorial coach’s voice on the pitch, as Townsend and McCarthy had been for Jack Charlton under a tactically rigid, tailored game-plan. Staunton’s greatest asset could have been the ability to keep things simple and sensible; to speak to his players in a language they understood. And if he could judiciously apply the knowledge gleaned from working under managers like Kenny Dalglish, Ron Atkinson, Gerárd Houllier and now Robson, then all the better.

The first press conference showed that Staunton had a lot to learn about communication. Not just the cringeworthy ‘I’m the gaffer’ spiel, but also his prickly assertion that he would ‘use (Bobby Robson) in whatever way I see fit.’ Yet, when Ireland played Sweden in March of 2006, we were treated to a refreshing, dominant performance against a near-full-strength team preparing for a World Cup, boasting Ibrahimovic and Larsson up front. A 3-0 win, with Duff, Keane and the late Liam Miller scoring well-worked and well-taken goals – the perfect start. Steven Reid was authoritative in midfield, debutant Kevin Doyle worked well with Keane up front, Joey O’Brien did well on his first cap, and there were some nice touches from substitute Stephen Ireland, returning to the international fold after falling out with Brian Kerr at underage level. There was serious attacking intent – full-backs encouraged to get forward, with two out-and-out wingers supporting two strikers. It seemed like a happy camp, and a possible formula for success. An antidote to the conservatism and fear that had scuppered Ireland’s World Cup campaign under Brian Kerr.

Then, after a training camp in the Algarve, Ireland played Chile at Lansdowne, deploying a bizarre 3-4-3 formation with Stephen Kelly making his debut on the right of the back line. It didn’t work, and Staunton was forced to revert to 4-4-2 after the South Americans took the lead. It was an experiment, but it made absolutely no sense, with players out of position all over the field. With only one more friendly planned before the real business of the Euro qualifiers, it was a chance missed to bed in the formation, personnel and tactics from the successful Sweden game. The following friendly was a disaster – a 4-0 defeat to the Netherlands, Ireland’s heaviest loss at home for over forty years. Again, the formation – 4-3-2-1 – was very experimental, and players were deployed in strange positions, playing like confused men. Steve Finnan was shoehorned in at left back; McGeady was lost on the left of a three-man central midfield; Kilbane and Stephen Elliott were playing ill-defined advanced roles in support of Clinton Morrison. It was abysmal, even allowing for the absence of a number of key players. Two games, no goals, five conceded, no distinct pattern of play, no semblance of consistency in selection or tactics. There seemed to be no rhyme or reason to Staunton’s decisions, and it didn’t bode well for the upcoming visit to Stuttgart to take on the Germans, who had reached the semi-finals of their home World Cup.

It was a lop-sided Irish team that took to the field in the opening group game. Steven Reid, clearly Ireland’s best central midfielder, was seconded to the right-hand side, while John O’Shea and Kevin Kilbane would toil out of position in the centre. Steve Finnan was preferred to Ian Harte at left-back, which deprived Ireland of balance and a set-piece threat. Dunne and Andy O’Brien showed promise as a centre-back pairing, and Doyle and Keane worked well up front, but with such a makeshift midfield, there was little cohesion in Ireland’s play, and they were punished by a deflected free-kick from Podolski. It wasn’t an embarrassment, but there was a clear deficiency in central midfield that needed to be addressed. O’Shea and Kilbane could tackle and make things awkward for their opposition, and didn’t do that badly in containing the threat of Ballack and Schweinsteiger – but their use of the ball left a lot to be desired. Duff, Keane and Doyle were often isolated and left hunting for scraps. In retrospect, the absent Lee Carsley, along with the Reids, would have been better players to build a midfield platform around.

An October game in Cyprus was next on the agenda; almost exactly a year on since Brian Kerr’s side had struggled to a 1-0 in the same venue. The players had fair warning – a Shay Given penalty save had averted disaster on that occasion, during a torrid first half in which the central midfield of Kavanagh and Kilbane had been overrun. Kilbane would line up there once again; Einstein’s definition of insanity came to mind. Alongside him was Stephen Ireland, making his first start. A lightweight, creative ball player, it was interesting to see him accommodated, especially with Duff and McGeady on the flanks, and Keane and Morrison up front. With five out-and-out attacking players and no holding midfielder, it looked like either an exciting placement of faith in an attacking game, or an absolute recipe for disaster.

It was the latter. 5-2, and it could have been more. Ireland started with nine Premier League footballers, yet were utterly outclassed by the rampant Cypriots, who gladly took advantage of the gaping hole in Ireland’s midfield. It was Ireland’s blackest day, possibly their most ignominious defeat in a competitive match. Unlike the narrow Macedonia defeat in 1997, when the Irish team was on top but fell foul to bad fortune and worse refereeing, this was a sound, comprehensive beating. With the Czech Republic about to visit Dublin, Staunton had to act quickly to turn things around.

He seemed to heed the lesson by recalling Lee Carsley and Andy Reid, along with the more combative Jonathan Douglas, in a 4-5-1. Paul McShane and Wayne Henderson replaced Andy O’Brien and Paddy Kenny, who had played abysmally in Nicosia. It was a response from Staunton, at least, and Ireland played well in a creditable 1-1 draw, which could have been more but for a lapse in concentration almost immediately after taking the lead, Koller cancelling out Kilbane’s effort. Robbie Keane also botched a header in the dying minutes as Staunton was narrowly denied a famous win. It showed that ‘the gaffer’ was somewhat capable of learning lessons and righting wrongs, but with one point from three games, Ireland were already playing catch-up in the group. A 5-0 win over San Marino in November improved the mood, with Robbie Keane scoring his first hat-trick for his country, and Doyle opening his international account with a trademark header.

The return game, however, was a disaster. Shane Long was given a competitive debut up front, and it looked like a suitably attacking lineup to put the Sammarinese to the sword, but Ireland struggled, and only took the lead through a Kilbane header in the second half. They couldn’t kill off the game, however, and incredibly, San Marino equalised with four minutes left to play after a catastrophic mix-up between Henderson, Dunne and McShane. Staunton was spared another horrifically embarrassing result when Stephen Ireland poked home from close range in the ninety-fifth minute.

It was clear at this point that Staunton was out of his depth. Two appalling away performances against two traditional minnows of European football; A back four that had changed with every game, and a terribly unsettled midfield in which twelve different players had been used in five games, showed an alarming level of indecisiveness on the manager’s part. Looking at Staunton’s outfield options, he really didn’t need to play players out of position.

Right Backs: Stephen Carr, Steve Finnan, Joey O’Brien

Left-backs: Ian Harte

Centre-backs: Richard Dunne, John O’Shea, Andy O’Brien, Paul McShane, Sean St. Ledger

Central midfield: Lee Carsley, Steven Reid, Jon Douglas, Alan Quinn, Liam Miller, Colin Healy, Stephen McPhail, Darren Potter, Darron Gibson

Left wing: Damien Duff, Kevin Kilbane, Stephen Hunt

Right wing: Aiden McGeady, Liam Lawrence

Attacking midfield: Stephen Ireland, Andy Reid

Strikers: Robbie Keane, Kevin Doyle, Clinton Morrison, Shane Long, Daryl Murphy, Anthony Stokes, Alan Lee

The only area where Ireland were struggling for depth was left-back, where hopefuls like Clive Clarke and Damien Delaney hadn’t pushed on, and the promising Stephen O’Halloran was still yet to break through at Aston Villa. Nevertheless, Harte only started one game in the entire campaign, with Staunton preferring to shoehorn right-footed players and central defenders on that side. The biggest selection dilemma was how to get the best out of creative ‘number ten’ players like Andy Reid and Stephen Ireland, when they didn’t comfortably fit into a 4-4-2 with Keane and Doyle up front. Keane was Ireland’s biggest asset, but was incapable of playing effectively as a lone striker. Trapattoni would nip this in the bud almost immediately when he took over, by sticking with a 4-4-2 and exiling those who didn’t fit, but Staunton struggled to be even half as decisive. Keane was on his own up front for the home game against Wales at Croke Park, with Duff and Stephen Ireland supporting from the flanks; an atrocious game was decided by a moment of magic from the young Man City playmaker. Staunton’s team lined up with three defensive midfielders who failed utterly to link with the front three, leaving them feeding off scraps for most of the game. It didn’t bode well for the Slovakia game the following Tuesday, with Keane suspended, and their opponents having won 5-1 in Wales earlier in the campaign.

However, Ireland produced what was easily Ireland’s finest performance under Staunton against the Slovaks. Kevin Doyle was deployed as a lone striker with Ireland in behind and Duff and McGeady on the flanks. The reborn Carsley was holding Kilbane’s hand in central midfield, and the back four looked settled, even with Finnan’s continued secondment at left-back. For once, it all made sense, and Doyle grabbed the only goal. It was an energetic display, defensively solid, with real shape and purpose to the attack. Suddenly, Ireland could point to a run of thirteen points from a possible fifteen since the Cyprus debacle, and it seemed like there was a glimmer of hope and optimism for the daunting trips to Bratislava and Prague in the autumn.

In the meantime, there was a US Cup obligation to be fulfilled, and Ireland were hit by the withdrawals of twenty-five players, including US-based Ronnie O’Brien, who declined the offer of a callup. In the end, Staunton would hand out caps to some of the most nondescript names in Ireland’s recent history; only Darren Potter, Daryl Murphy and Stephen O’Halloran seemed like realistic competitors for places in the squad in the long-term. Others, like Joe O’Cearuill, Peter Murphy, Alan Bennett, Joe Gamble, and most infamously, US college footballer Joe Lapira, would never play for Ireland again. Stephen Gleeson, then of Wolves, would have to wait ten years for his next cap. It was also the last hurrah for Alan O’Brien, a Newcastle reserve in whom Staunton had placed a lot of faith. 1-1 draws with Ecuador and Bolivia, with goals from Kevin Doyle and Shane Long, seemed respectable enough, given the makeshift nature of the squad. In August, Ireland beat Denmark 4-0 in Copenhagen, Long and Keane with two goals apiece. For a time in the second half, Darron Gibson and Darren Potter patrolled the centre of midfield with aplomb, showing the intriguing possibilities of an engine room without Kilbane or O’Shea ruining everything.

On to Slovakia, and Grannygate. Ireland were weakened by an injury to Damien Duff, but it allowed Kilbane to go out to his natural position, and there seemed to be some reasonable balance to the midfield, with Ireland partnering Carsley in the middle. The former opened the scoring, and after Slovakia equalised, Kevin Doyle put Ireland 2-1 ahead with his finest goal for Ireland, a thunderbolt with his weaker foot from outside the box. Alas, Ireland continued the familiar Irish tradition of falling back and being wasteful with possession away from home, and allowed Marek Cech in to equalise in the dying moments. McCarthy had Macedonia in ’99; Kerr had Israel in ’05 – now Staunton could add his own chapter of Irish last-minute disappointments. Ireland would have to win in Prague.

And that wasn’t the last of the setbacks. The saga of Stephen Ireland’s grannies has been told to death elsewhere, and there’s no need to recount it in this space. The question must be raised of why the player would never return under future managers – how could bridges have been burned so badly? Kevin MacDonald was Staunton’s assistant at the time, and it was revealing to hear Gareth Farrelly, who played under McDonald for Aston Villa’s youths and reserves, talk about his propensity for outright emotional abuse under the guise of ‘tough love.’ And just this week, Keith Fahey has talked about his discomfort in the international setup, intimating at a kind of toxicity created by ‘certain players’ which could have been discomfiting for a sensitive, introverted young player. It could also be that Ireland simply wasn’t motivated to play for Ireland, and was ready to clutch at any old excuse to cry off – certainly, he didn’t seem motivated to play football at all in the latter years of his career, once a succession of lucrative contracts had set him up for life.

There is another possible factor. With Robbie Keane nailed on as captain and most high-profile player, there was no way for the national side to accommodate someone in the number ten role favoured by players like Ireland, Andy Reid and later Wes Hoolahan. Keane was the classic, old-fashioned poacher – always at his best playing off the more physical, old-school target man. Unfortunately, this formation had already begun to go out of vogue in European football. The AC Milan side that won the Champions League in 2007 played with Inzaghi as a lone striker, departing from the two-pronged strikeforce of Crespo and Shevchenko that lost the final in 2005; the Champions League and World Cup would henceforth only be won by teams playing 4-5-1 or 4-3-3 – formations which couldn’t effectively accommodate all of Keane, Doyle, Duff, and a creative midfielder like Reid or Ireland. I suspect that Stephen Ireland may have known this, and not fancied his chances of becoming an orthodox box-to-box midfielder or wide player in the 4-4-2 which Ireland were destined to keep on deploying. Andy Reid and Wes Hoolahan would find similar frustrations in years to come, as the latter had to wait until Keane’s quasi-retirement to get a fair run in the green jersey. It’s not scandalous to suggest that Robbie’s indispensability held Ireland back at times, forcing Ireland to adopt an antiquated formation that conceded possession in midfield and forced a more direct gameplan under Staunton’s successor. The Slovakia game at Croke Park, in Keane’s absence, was the last qualifying game against a top-three seed that Ireland would win until Germany in 2015 – a run of over twenty games.

On to the Czech Republic, and Ireland were beaten by a team with decent pedigree playing relatively poorly, in transition after the premature international retirement of Pavel Nedved. Home and away, the Czechs were there for the taking. Stephen Hunt, pilloried by the locals for his part in Peter Cech’s horrendous injury the year before, epitomised Ireland’s effort; working hard, relishing the chorus of boos from the home fans, but delivering little in the way of end product. Almost inevitably, he was sent off for a rash challenge on the hour, when Ireland were already 1-0 down. That was the way it finished, and Ireland were as good as out.

The Germany game at Croke Park was notable only for a midfield masterclass from Andy Reid and a poor miss from Robbie Keane which would have given Staunton a creditable victory and arguably strengthened his case to stay in the job. It’s probably better for all concerned that he missed. Reid’s performance was encouraging, but with both teams playing 4-4-2, there was a lot of space in the centre for him to work with. Four days later, against Cyprus, he would be up against a more compact five-man midfield, and was anonymous alongside Joey O’Brien, who couldn’t effectively fill the shoes of the suspended Carsley. Cyprus took the lead with ten minutes to go, and Ireland were spared greater humiliation when Steve Finnan equalised deep into stoppage time. Boos cascaded from the Croke Park stands – it was a new low against a team that had been utterly outclassed by Brian Kerr’s side on their previous visit to Dublin. It was the last straw, and Staunton's contract was brought to a merciful end after an FAI meeting the week after.

Ireland would finish the group on seventeen points, ten points behind Germany, twelve behind the Czechs. Ireland had dropped seven points in their games with Cyprus and Slovakia, and taken only two from a possible twelve against the top two seeds, neither of whom were in dominant form. Staunton could point to the fact that Ireland had finished in third having started the campaign as fourth seeds, and were unbeaten at home in the group – but writing off the San Marino game, they only scored four goals in five games – a poor return given how gung-ho the tactics were, and how many attacking players were thrown on to the field for most of those games. And the away record was abysmal. Four points, three of those gained by Stephen Ireland’s last-minute strike in San Marino.

Injuries to Damien Duff, Steve Finnan and Steven Reid didn’t help, but Ireland were arguably well-placed to replace all three – Staunton just went with the wrong options. Stephen Carr was alienated from the squad after the first qualifier; Liam Lawrence was ignored after being in the first squad in 2006; Lee Carsley was jettisoned for the first few games; Andy O’Brien and Paddy Kenny were unfairly scapegoated for the Cyprus defeat, and neither man played for Ireland again. O’Brien was a loss, being only twenty-six at the time; he would be a regular Premier League starter for another five years. His decision to quit international football in 2008 hinted at disillusionment with the setup, and the criticism he shipped after a game when the midfield had offered absolutely no protection to the back four. Then there was the Stephen Ireland situation. Staunton was appointed on the basis that, as a former player who knew the modern game, he would be able to relate to his charges and create an inclusive camp; this didn’t happen, and the appointment of Kevin MacDonald as assistant, when he was known in the game for emotionally mistreating young players, was another mistake.

Staunton’s selections and tactics were consistently chaotic and disordered. Brian Kerr had started seventeen players in ten games in the previous campaign. Staunton, in eleven games, started twenty-six. There were eight different central midfield partnerships. Eight different players – Finnan, Kelly, O’Shea, Kilbane, Steven Reid, Ireland, Joey O’Brien and Andy Keogh – found themselves starting in positions they’d barely, if ever, played for their clubs. The entire set-up was an absolute mess, devoid of cohesion, consistency and common-sense. Staunton was wracked with indecision, failing at every turn to learn from the sporadic patches of promising football that Ireland played, or the glaring weaknesses that their opponents continuously exposed. There was no attempt to build the team and game-plan around the strengths of its better players, as Trapattoni would do with such stubborn conviction. Stephen Hunt, years later, would admit that Staunton ‘wasn’t really on it’ tactically, but he seemed popular with the players regardless – perhaps because of the lax discipline and ‘bonding’ sessions that he brought back, after certain players had complained about Kerr’s more professional approach. The players would have a rude awakening under their next coach.

Those twenty months between February 2006 and October 2007 set Irish football back so many years – that talented pool of players, coming into their prime in 2008, would spend the following three campaigns playing monstrously defensive, long-ball, percentage-playing, set-piece-based football under Trapattoni, who could point to the Staunton era and confidently justify such negativity: ‘look what happens when you try to be adventurous.’ As shown by the win over Slovakia and the performances at home against Germany and the Czechs, the players were perfectly capable of mixing it at international level and going after teams, within a side that was reasonably well-balanced and motivated. Staunton didn’t possess the know-how to find that balance on a consistent basis – those respectable performances seemed to occur by accident rather than design.

It’s unfortunate that this great servant to Irish football would suffer the indignity of being our worst ever manager. But there are no excuses. He should have had the humility to know the job was beyond his capabilities. The FAI should have known better and conducted their search for a manager more professionally – it stank of a facile ‘jobs for the boys’ appointment, indicative of the short-term, ‘it’ll be grand’ attitude of John Delaney’s tenure.

The Brian Kerr Era - A Retrospective

Stephen Kenny's appointment brings echoes of the last time Ireland appointed a home-based coach to the senior international job, with the remit of reinventing a stale Irish side with an injection of young, promising footballers.

I have a personal motivation for undertaking a retrospective of Brian Kerr’s Ireland tenure. I was fourteen years old when Ireland won the U16 and U18 European Championships, eighteen when Kerr got the senior job, and twenty-one when he was sacked. I spent my most formative years, the years that shaped my personality as an adult, truly believing that a great era of Irish footballing dominance was on the horizon – a generation of success to eclipse anything achieved under Jack Charlton. As a teenager, I played out those fantasies on Pro Evolution Soccer, where my genetically-modified Irish teams swept to World and European glory; Stephen McPhail threading sumptuous passes for Robbie Keane; Damien Duff and Richie Partridge cutting through defences with Maradona-like evasiveness; Richard Sadlier dominating in the air like an Irish Oliver Bierhoff. That was, I hoped, the true destiny of the Irish team in the New Millennium, and Kerr would be the man to deliver – as soon as Mick McCarthy did the decent thing and finally stepped aside. In time, those dreams and expectations would be mercilessly crushed – the triumph of harsh, worldly reality over the fantasies of a naïve, hopeless romantic.

Kerr had been around a while – a spell as assistant to Liam Tuohy in the youth setup in the mid-eighties came to an end when Tuohy clashed with Jack Charlton, and Kerr remained a critic of Big Jack’s style of play and abrasive relationship with native coaches. He had a fruitful period with St. Patrick’s Athletic in the late eighties and nineties before taking the Irish youth job, winning two titles. He was known for being that rarity in the mostly amateur Irish domestic game – an ambitious, knowledgeable professional. A semi-final appearance for Ireland in the 1997 World Youth Cup was unprecedented, made even more impressive by the fact that it wasn’t a star-studded Irish squad – Damien Duff was the only player who would go on to make a competitive senior appearance. It was a team of future journeymen and League of Ireland stalwarts that eliminated Spain, and competed so manfully against an Argentina side boasting Samuel, Riquelme, Placente, Scaloni, Cambiasso and Aimar. It spoke volumes about Kerr’s ability to take a rag-tag group and get them playing confident, constructive, winning football.

Later, he would also prove capable of taking strong, highly-rated squads, and delivering on expectation. The 1998 European Youth Champions boasted not only Robbie Keane and Richard Dunne, but future caps Barry and Alan Quinn, Gary Doherty, and Stephen McPhail, as well as the highly-rated Jason Gavin and Richie Partridge, who would gain senior experience with Middlesbrough and Liverpool. From the U16 cohort, John O’Shea, Liam Miller, Andy Reid, Joe Murphy, John Thompson, Jim Goodwin and Thomas Butler would all win caps, while Colin Healy and Richie Sadlier (in the group that competed in the 1999 World Youth Cup) were also future internationals. In 2002, the Irish U-18 squad came third in the European Championships and qualified for the 2003 World Youth Cup – from that squad, Stephen Elliott, Stephen Kelly, Glenn Whelan, Kevin Doyle and Keith Fahey would eventually be capped.

It was a seemingly phenomenal stream of Irish talent, brought through by a man who could seemingly harness their abilities, create an ambitious, positive environment, and encourage them to compete to the fullest of their potential – to beat the future stars of Spain, England, Croatia, Italy, Portugal, and Germany.

While Kerr was making a name for himself, McCarthy’s senior side were struggling. The autumn of 1999 was an exasperating time – a squad which had shown itself capable of beating Croatia and Yugoslavia was reduced to a rabble by some bizarre decisions and monstrously negative football. Washed-up veterans like Cascarino and McLoughlin were stinking up the side, and when Roy Keane was injured, the midfield was patrolled by unimpressive, one-dimensional, English-born journeymen like Carsley and Holland. The immense talent of Damien Duff was reduced to hugging the touchline, hoofing crosses into the box, with Gary Kelly out of position on the other side. Turkey passing Ireland off the pitch in Lansdowne was a low point, when placed in such stark contrast to the youth teams’ excellence; it seemed farcical that Stephen McPhail was ignored despite playing well for a top-three Premiership team and UEFA Cup semi-finalist, while the incumbents – Kinsella, Carsley, McLoughlin and Holland – were all plying their trades in the English second tier.

McCarthy’s fortunes changed dramatically when he abandoned the negative tactics and tried a more progressive approach (who knew?) but even throughout the 2002 World Cup campaign, and the coming of age of Dunne, Keane and Duff, there was a sense that this was just the beginning. When Kerr eventually took the job (a prospect that seemed more likely in the fallout of Saipan), it seemed certain that the older, willing but limited senior pros would be cast aside to allow the more dynamic, pacey, technical young players to make their mark. By 2002, O’Shea was playing first-team football at Man United; Partridge and Barrett had debuted for Liverpool and Arsenal; Healy had made a European debut for Celtic; Sadlier was scoring goals in the First Division; Andy Reid had broken into Nottingham Forest’s team at eighteen; McPhail, the Quinns, Doherty and Gavin had built up a good body of Premiership experience and not looked out of place. Barrett and Healy demonstrated their potential by scoring in a post-World Cup friendly against Finland. There was also an outstanding young Shelbourne playmaker called Wes Hoolahan who looked destined for a career at a higher level, and was named in a senior squad towards the end of the year. While Saipan had divided the country, and the Far East adventure had been compromised by thoughts of what could have been, the future still looked bright.

Graham Barrett, with Kilbane and Healy, celebrates his first goal for Ireland

Kerr’s appointment looked like a rare sensible decision by the FAI. Names like Bryan Robson and Philippe Troussier hadn’t inspired confidence, and David O’Leary had unfinished business with Leeds. Shorn of Roy Keane, Ireland had looked tired and bereft of ideas in their home defeat to Switzerland. Without their disgraced former captain to cajole and elevate those around him, the likes of Breen, McAteer, Holland, Kinsella and Kilbane looked incapable of adding anything beyond blundering, misdirected graft. It was 1999 all over again, and the departure of McCarthy came as something of a relief. Ireland needed a coach with imagination and ambition; a belief in youth and a progressive style of football; someone who would encourage the best from his players. Kerr seemed like a perfect fit.

It was curious, then, to see the same old, same old for the game away to Georgia. A midfield of Carsley (on the right wing, bizarrely), Holland, Kinsella and Kilbane laboured to a 2-1 win in Tbilisi and an uninspiring four points against Albania, the home game won with an own goal in the last minute after a dreadful display. The 1-1 draw at home to Russia was equally dismal, and the campaign petered out with an insipid defeat in Switzerland. Kerr hadn’t made any changes, aside from bringing John O’Shea into the starting XI. It was understandable (in a way) to give players who had done so well in 2002 one more campaign to show their worth before genuinely reinventing things, but it should have been clear from the outset that some players were spent forces, or just technically not up to it. Andy Reid and Liam Miller made their debuts in the 2003/4 friendlies, while Barrett and Alan Quinn shined in an excellent 1-0 win in Amsterdam in June 2004. It seemed like this was the template for Kerr to build his team for the 2006 qualifiers. With Roy Keane committed to a return, it would have made sense to populate the other midfield places with younger, faster and technically adroit players.

One of the big quandaries was the almost-inexplicably bulletproof status of Kevin Kilbane. A weak link in the 2002 side, his hard running, aerial ability and defensive work was compromised by an infuriating propensity for wasting possession through poorly-controlled balls and wayward distribution. A James McClean prototype, one might say. Kerr kept faith with him, often relegating Duff to positions on the right and up front where he was less effective. Instead of dropping him, Kerr decided to accommodate him in central midfield, the logic being that his athleticism would prove an effective foil for Roy Keane – still a force, but a significantly less mobile player than in times past. Sometimes, it worked; other times, Kilbane’s technical limitations and headless ball-chasing were exposed even more ruthlessly than on the wing. In retrospect, Steven Reid would have been a much better central midfield partner – even the more diminutive Miller, Andy Reid or McPhail would have benefited from the freedom of playing alongside one of the world’s best defensive midfielders. It’s a great pity that Colin Healy was so badly affected by a succession of serious injuries.

The experiment seemed to be working, as Ireland topped their group in the autumn of 2004, drawing away to Switzerland and France. The latter was a particularly eye-catching performance, as Ireland passed with confidence and purpose, putting themselves in a great position with back-to-back games with Israel to come. That night in Tel-Aviv proved to be a turning point for Kerr. It was a repeat of Mick McCarthy’s Skopje nightmare in 1999, when an early lead turned the game into a battle of containment, follied by a late equaliser. Kerr’s negative tactics played into Israel’s hands, as Ireland sat back and invited pressure, which was inevitably rewarded in front of a partisan crowd. Bringing on Matt Holland for one of the strikers – as McCarthy had done six years previously – completely ceded territory and possession, and Kerr was punished. With Ireland struggling to keep possession and establish a link with the front players, surely Andy Reid – in the form of his career – would have made more sense as an extra midfielder; but he remained on the bench. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, of course, but the sense of déjà vu was overwhelming. Kerr did exactly what McCarthy had done in his worst moment.

The return game was even more unforgiveable. With Roy Keane absent, Holland and Kilbane manned the centre of midfield – an alarming prospect. However, thanks to the set-piece brilliance of Ian Harte, the vision of Reid, the dribbling of Duff, and the cheeky finishing of Robbie Keane, Ireland found themselves 2-0 up. Fatefully, the Spurs striker hobbled off injured, and Kerr was forced into a decision – straight swap, or total reshuffle. He decided to bring on Graham Kavanagh – another in our long line of limited thirty-something journeyman midfielders – and push Duff up front, allowing Kilbane to go to his natural role, wasting possession on the wing. Immediately, we had two ageing, immobile players in the engine-room and virtually no attacking threat on the left, with Duff moved from where he had been causing havoc, into an isolated role alongside a static Clinton Morrison, who was having one of his more ‘laid-back’ games for Ireland. Israel grew into the game, and while their goals were somewhat fortuitous, it was an almost-inevitable consequence of Kerr’s negative changes. While the shithousing antics of Dudu Awat provided the game with an appropriate villain, the manager’s role in two dropped points could not be ignored. A few days later, Stephen Elliott made his first competitive start for Ireland against the Faroes, and showed why he would have been a much better replacement for Keane, with a lively, pacey display.

The game against France yielded a better display, with Roy Keane giving his final masterclass for Ireland, but his midfield partner had a torrid day; Kilbane constantly ran into blind alleys, looking every bit a man out of position. Henry’s wondergoal gave France the win, and a first home competitive defeat under Kerr. It would be an uphill struggle to achieve a playoff place from there – Ireland would have to beat Cyprus and Switzerland.

The game in Nicosia foreshadowed the 2006 Staunton debacle, as Ireland were outclassed for much of the game. Only a magnificent penalty save from Given and an opportunistic finish from Elliott gave Ireland a 1-0 win, but there was little to suggest Ireland would have enough to overcome the Swiss. So it proved on a miserable Wednesday night at HQ, and Kerr didn’t help his cause by naming John O’Shea and Matt Holland in midfield, with Kilbane seconded to the left. Shorn of Duff and Roy Keane, perhaps Ireland just didn’t have the personnel to get a win, but more could have been made of the available squad. Steven Reid was sitting on the bench, surely wondering what he needed to do to get an opportunity. Liam Miller may not have excelled at Man United, but he surely would have fared better than the out-of-position O’Shea, and provided some form of passing ability and goal threat. Aidan McGeady was in the form of his life, but was still ignored when the Irish midfield needed something – anything – besides the same old huffing and puffing. There is a rough, cruel irony that the last act of Brian Kerr’s Irish career – the man who was feted as a progressive believer in youth and the Beautiful Game – was a long ball hoofed by Shay Given, hoping to find the head of Gary Doherty in a crowded Swiss penalty box, as the same tired faces from McCarthy's final game in charge - Kilbane and Holland - lumbered around in midfield to the same minimal effect they had offered in the three intervening years.

Kerr was predictably dismissed a few days later, and it was jarring to hear him, on an RTE documentary shown that Christmas, claim that ‘maybe we just didn’t have the players.’ Kerr had at his disposal a prime Given, Carr, Finnan, Harte, Dunne, O’Shea, Duff, Robbie Keane, Andy Reid, and Steven Reid. He had a 34-year-old Roy Keane, who was still a force at international level. He had young players who did well in friendlies, but were jettisoned when the serious business began, like Miller, Alan Quinn, Barrett, Elliott and McGeady. Perhaps if Kerr had showed the kind of imagination and bravery he'd demonstrated in his underage years, an opportunity could have been found for someone like Wes Hoolahan, then playing in the SPL. Kevin Doyle was scoring goals in Europe for Cork, and later the top end of the Championship for Reading, and Daryl Murphy was making waves at Sunderland and scoring freely for the U21s, while Kerr was persisting with Gary Doherty – a centre-back who hadn’t played regularly up front at club level since the age of 18, at Luton Town. Given that weaker Ireland squads have qualified for tournaments in recent history, it’s clear that it was Kerr’s decision making, conservatism, and lack of trust in his young players that sealed his fate.

Poor management is one factor; there is one other at play.

Kerr and his assistant, Chris Hughton, demanded a high level of professionalism from their players, a fact welcomed by Roy Keane, who was sick of the drinking sessions and haphazard preparation under both Charlton and McCarthy. However, the video and tactics sessions and all-round tight ship under Kerr did not meet with the approval of the players, many of whom saw their international breaks as a welcome change of pace from the day-to-day grind in an increasingly tactical and foreign-influenced English game. That reflects more on the players than Kerr, who was ahead of his time in this regard. Also, there have been murmurings about players, having attained wealth and status in their careers since their youth days, not taking Kerr seriously enough. It was instructive to hear Gary Breen – dropped by Kerr in favour of Andy O’Brien and Richard Dunne – talking recently about how players may not respond as respectfully to Stephen Kenny, as someone who is virtually unknown in England, as opposed to the likes of Trapattoni or O’Neill. If that was the attitude towards Kerr, then the fault lies with the ‘Billy Big Bollocks’ attitude of the players. Danish and Swedish players – even the big egos of Ibrahimovic and Eriksen – have always responded positively to their national coaches, even those who had never coached outside Scandinavia.

Furthermore, we have the issue of Irish players failing to make the best of their potential. Keith Foy was a promising left-back at Nottingham Forest, one of the key players in Ireland’s U16 European Champions, scoring a wonderful free-kick in the final against Italy. In an interesting interview in 2018, he admitted that the lures of going out on the town, with the status of a young professional footballer in a medium-sized English city and the temptations it brought, were too much to resist, and he quickly went from being a regular starter for Forest to a part-timer at Monaghan United. Too many Irish players succumbed to the lure of booze and birds; too few showed the professionalism required to extract the maximum from their natural talent. Why didn’t the likes of McPhail, Hoolahan and Andy Reid hit the gym a bit harder, when it was clear a lack of strength and athleticism was holding them back? Why did so many gifted players from those youth teams succumb to career-hampering injuries? This may be speculative, but could it have been substandard nutrition and fitness, and haphazard rehabbing, making them more susceptible to strains and tears, or inhibiting their recoveries?

British and Irish youth culture in the mid-2000s was one of binges and excess, and many a promising football career fell victim to it; in later years, Darron Gibson and Anthony Stokes would come to personify this wastefulness. Maybe certain players should have tried harder to give Kerr a more compelling case for inclusion. For all I’ve lamented over the years about Kevin Kilbane’s technical deficiencies, at least he made the absolute best of his talent and showed genuine determination and professionalism throughout his career, like Glenn Whelan after him.

The Brian Kerr era will always go down as an opportunity wasted. Given, Dunne, Duff and Keane should not have waited ten years to play in another international tournament, by which time they were long past their prime. Roy Keane should have had his chance of redemption in a green shirt. The stars of the underage teams between 1998 and 2002, along with their manager, should have been able to produce on the senior stage. But the perennial Irish bugbears of fear-based conservatism and poor decision-making in our management; added to a lack of confidence, determination and self-discipline at the level of the individual, ensured that our dreams would not be realised.

Stephen Kenny and his young proteges will do well to learn from the failures of our not-too-distant past.

Coming soon - the Staunton Years. Here's a sneak preview...